Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Eubulides, J.J.C. Smart and Thomas Reid

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93 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics should avoid talk of past, present or future [Smart]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
The existence of tensed verbs shows that not all truths are necessary truths [Reid]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
Coherence is consilience, simplicity, analogy, and fitting into a web of belief [Smart]
We need comprehensiveness, as well as self-coherence [Smart]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 7. Ad Hominem
An ad hominem argument is good, if it is shown that the man's principles are inconsistent [Reid]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
If you know your father, but don't recognise your father veiled, you know and don't know the same person [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
If you say truly that you are lying, you are lying [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / b. The Heap paradox ('Sorites')
Removing one grain doesn't destroy a heap, so a heap can't be destroyed [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
Accepting the existence of anything presupposes the notion of existence [Reid]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Powers are quite distinct and simple, and so cannot be defined [Reid]
Thinkers say that matter has intrinsic powers, but is also passive and acted upon [Reid]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
It is obvious that there could not be a power without a subject which possesses it [Reid]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 5. Universals as Concepts
Universals are not objects of sense and cannot be imagined - but can be conceived [Reid]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
Only individuals exist [Reid]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
No one thinks two sheets possess a single whiteness, but all agree they are both white [Reid]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
Objects have an essential constitution, producing its qualities, which we are too ignorant to define [Reid]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
Continuity is needed for existence, otherwise we would say a thing existed after it ceased to exist [Reid]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 13. No Identity over Time
We treat slowly changing things as identical for the sake of economy in language [Reid]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Real identity admits of no degrees [Reid]
Identity is familiar to common sense, but very hard to define [Reid]
Identity can only be affirmed of things which have a continued existence [Reid]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
Impossibilites are easily conceived in mathematics and geometry [Reid, by Molnar]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
If someone denies that he is thinking when he is conscious of it, we can only laugh [Reid]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
The existence of ideas is no more obvious than the existence of external objects [Reid]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 4. Solipsism
We are only aware of other beings through our senses; without that, we are alone in the universe [Reid]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
Truths are self-evident to sensible persons who understand them clearly without prejudice [Reid]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Sensation is not committed to any external object, but perception is [Reid]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
Primary qualities are the object of mathematics [Reid]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
Secondary qualities conjure up, and are confused with, the sensations which produce them [Reid]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
It is unclear whether a toothache is in the mind or in the tooth, but the word has a single meaning [Reid]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 1. Common Sense
Reid is seen as the main direct realist of the eighteenth century [Reid, by Robinson,H]
Many truths seem obvious, and point to universal agreement - which is what we find [Reid]
In obscure matters the few must lead the many, but the many usually lead in common sense [Reid]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
Without memory we could have no concept of duration [Reid]
We all trust our distinct memories (but not our distinct imaginings) [Reid]
The theory of ideas, popular with philosophers, means past existence has to be proved [Reid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
People dislike believing without evidence, and try to avoid it [Reid]
I simply reject evidence, if it is totally contrary to my web of belief [Smart]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
If non-rational evidence reaches us, it is reason which then makes use of it [Reid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony
We treat testimony with a natural trade off of belief and caution [Reid, by Fricker,M]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / c. Direction of explanation
The height of a flagpole could be fixed by its angle of shadow, but that would be very unusual [Smart]
Universe expansion explains the red shift, but not vice versa [Smart]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
Explanations are bad by fitting badly with a web of beliefs, or fitting well into a bad web [Smart]
Deducing from laws is one possible way to achieve a coherent explanation [Smart]
Explanation of a fact is fitting it into a system of beliefs [Smart]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / d. Consilience
An explanation is better if it also explains phenomena from a different field [Smart]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
If scientific explanation is causal, that rules out mathematical explanation [Smart]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
Scientific explanation tends to reduce things to the unfamiliar (not the familiar) [Smart]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
A person is a unity, and doesn't come in degrees [Reid]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
Consciousness is an indefinable and unique operation [Reid]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
Consciousness is the power of mind to know itself, and minds are grounded in powers [Reid]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 2. Persons as Responsible
Personal identity is the basis of all rights, obligations and responsibility [Reid]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 3. Persons as Reasoners
I can hardly care about rational consequence if it wasn't me conceiving the antecedent [Reid]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
The identity of a thief is only known by similarity, but memory gives certainty in our own case [Reid]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity
Memory reveals my past identity - but so does testimony of other witnesses [Reid]
If consciousness is transferable 20 persons can be 1; forgetting implies 1 can be 20 [Reid]
Boy same as young man, young man same as old man, old man not boy, if forgotten! [Reid]
If a stolen horse is identified by similitude, its identity is not therefore merely similitude [Reid]
If consciousness is personal identity, it is continually changing [Reid]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 7. Self and Thinking
Thoughts change continually, but the self doesn't [Reid]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
The first motion or effect cannot be produced necessarily, so the First Cause must be a free agent [Reid]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 3. Constraints on the will
A willed action needs reasonable understanding of what is to be done [Reid]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
Our own nature attributes free determinations to our own will [Reid]
We are morally free, because we experience it, we are accountable, and we pursue projects [Reid]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
We must first conceive things before we can consider them [Reid]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 8. Human Thought
The structure of languages reveals a uniformity in basic human opinions [Reid]
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
Only philosophers treat ideas as objects [Reid]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
First we notice and name attributes ('abstracting'); then we notice that subjects share them ('generalising') [Reid]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
If you can't distinguish the features of a complex object, your notion of it would be a muddle [Reid]
Only mature minds can distinguish the qualities of a body [Reid]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 9. Ambiguity
The ambiguity of words impedes the advancement of knowledge [Reid]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Reference is by name, or a term-plus-circumstance, or ostensively, or by description [Reid]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference
A word's meaning is the thing conceived, as fixed by linguistic experts [Reid]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / c. Agent causation
Reid said that agent causation is a unique type of causation [Reid, by Stout,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
A motive is merely an idea, like advice, and not a force for action [Reid]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 3. Taste
There are axioms of taste - such as a general consensus about a beautiful face [Reid]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
If an attempted poisoning results in benefits, we still judge the agent a poisoner [Reid]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
We shouldn't do to others what would be a wrong to us in similar circumstances [Reid]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
To be virtuous, we must care about duty [Reid]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / e. Honour
Every worthy man has a principle of honour, and knows what is honourable [Reid]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Negative utilitarianism implies that the world should be destroyed, to avoid future misery [Smart]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 3. Motivation for Altruism
Any group interested in ethics must surely have a sentiment of generalised benevolence [Smart]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Similar effects come from similar causes, and causes are only what are sufficient for the effects [Reid]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
Day and night are constantly conjoined, but they don't cause one another [Reid, by Crane]
We all know that mere priority or constant conjunction do not have to imply causation [Reid]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
Regular events don't imply a cause, without an innate conviction of universal causation [Reid]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
The principle of the law of nature is that matter is passive, and is acted upon [Reid]
Scientists don't know the cause of magnetism, and only discover its regulations [Reid]
Laws are rules for effects, but these need a cause; rules of navigation don't navigate [Reid]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / a. Special relativity
Special relativity won't determine a preferred frame, but we can pick one externally [Smart]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / b. General relativity
Unlike Newton, Einstein's general theory explains the perihelion of Mercury [Smart]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / b. Rate of time
If time flows, then 'how fast does it flow?' is a tricky question [Smart]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series
The past, present, future and tenses of A-theory are too weird, and should be analysed indexically [Smart]